Books
1. Causation and Persistence: A Theory of Causation (New York: Oxford University Press), 1997.
Samples from reviews and comments on Causation and Persistence:
“Ehring does an impressive job of articulating and defending his version of an identity theory, good enough to resuscitate it as a live philosophical option.” Peter Lipton, The Times Literary Supplement.
“In this illuminating and original book, Ehring attempts to release reductionism from its Humean shackles . . .. He argues forcefully that accounts of causation are wholly generalist are doomed to failure.” Helen Beebee, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
“Causation and Persistence is a detailed and extremely novel attempt to address perhaps the most basic of all philosophical issues.” John Carroll, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
“This book ranks with the best of contemporary work on the metaphysics of causation, both because of its thorough and unified treatment of the literature and because its author faces head-on the most difficult foundational questions about causality: How, at the most basic level, do causes bring about their effects? What are the mechanisms operating in the world to bind its parts together? Ehring’s answers to these questions are clear, original, and sup- ported by sophisticated arguments. The book is a fine example of what C. B. Martin calls ‘ontological seriousness,’ a concern for the truthmakers of (in this case) our causal claims, for figuring out how causality works at the most fundamental level.” David Robb, The Philosophical Review
“Ehring’s new book is the single most significant advance in the philosophical debate about the nature of causality in the last decade or more. It not only faces the most serious problems–like causal preemption and the direction of causation–it moves towards creative and persuasive solutions to them. It will have an appeal well beyond the narrow specialist.”–Alexander Rosenberg, Duke University
“A high-quality philosophical work on a topic of central importance.”–David Papineau, Kings College, London
2. Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2011.
Sample of review comments on Tropes:
“Ehring’s Tropes is an intellectual tour-de-force . . .. . . . that old story about a couple of admires of Michaelangelo’s David comes to mind. Q: ‘How do you think he did it? A: ‘He took a chunk of marble and chipped away everything that didn’t look like David. Ehring uses the chisel of finely honed logic to hammer away on opposing ontological view. What’s left? Natural Class Trope Nominalism.” Eric Weislogel, Philosophy in Review
“A fascinating book written by a bold philosopher.” Anna-Sofia Maurin, Journal of Philosophy
“Crucial reading for anyone interested in Trope Theory.” Tuomas E. Tahko, The Philosophical Quarterly
“Novel solutions to an age-old problem.” Brian Jonathan Garrett, Philosophy in Review
“This book provides a rigorous and highly original defence of the claim that properties are tropes (i.e. particulars) as opposed to universals.” S.C. Gibb, Analysis
“Tropes is a systematic investigation into the metaphysics of properties, aiming to motivate and defend trope theory, and more specifically Natural Class Trope Nominalism (NCTN). Ehring’s book treats an impressive span of relevant
positions, considerations, debates and objections with charity and clarity; it’s also a real page-turner, at least if one has (as I do) a taste for analytic twists and turns.” Jessica Wilson, Mind
Sample of review comments on What Matters in Survival From Referee Reports:
“The author provides powerful, thorough, original, and ingenious arguments for a highly radical view, ‘Survival Nihilism.’”
“The book is an excellently argued, very clear piece that engages well with the literature. It’s really very good, and as I hope I’ve made clear, will be an important contribution to the literature.”
Articles
(l) “The Brownian Direction of Causation”, The Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (1980) pp. 51-56. PDF
(2) “Bunzl on Causal Overdetermination,” Philosophical Studies 39 (1981) pp. 209-210. PDF
(3) “On Mackie’s New Account of Causal Priority,” Analysis 41 (1981) pp. 82-83. PDF
(4) “Manipulability Theory and Event Types,” Analysis 42 (1982) pp. 149-151. PDF
(5) “Causal Asymmetry,” The Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982) pp. 761-774. PDF
(6) “Goal-Directed Processes,” Southwest Philosophical Studies 9 (1983), pp. 39-47. PDF
(7) “Probabilistic Causality and Preemption,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (1984) pp. 55-57. PDF
(8) “Mental Identity,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (1984) pp. 189-194. PDF
(9) “Negative Feedback and Goals,” Nature and System 6 (1984), pp. 217-220. PDF
(10) “The System-Property Theory of Goal-Directed Processes,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (1984) pp. 497-504. PDF
(11) “Simultaneous Causation and Causal Chains,” Analysis 45 (1985) pp. 98- 102. PDF
(12) “Enc on Functions,” Philosophical Inquiry 7 (1985) pp. 74-80. PDF
(13) “`Normal’ Intentional Action,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1985) pp. 155-157. PDF
(14) “Dispositions and Functions,” Erkenntnis 23 (1985) pp. 243-249. PDF
(15) “Personal Identity and the Causal Theory of Memory,” The Modern Schoolman 63 (1985) pp 65-67. PDF
(16) “Closed Causal Loops, Single Causes, and Asymmetry,”Analysis 46 (1986) pp. 33-35. PDF
(17) “The Transference Theory of Causation,” Synthese 67 (1986), pp. 249-258. PDF
(18) “Causation and Causal Factuals,” Erkenntnis 25 (1986) pp. 77-84. PDF
(19) “Teleology and Impossible Goals Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1986) pp. 127-131. PDF
(20) “Accidental Functions,” Dialogue 25 (1986) pp. 291-302. PDF
(21) “Causal Processes and Causal Interactions,” PSA, Vol. 1 (1986). PDF
(22) “Survival and Trivial Facts,” Analysis 47 (1987) pp. 50-54. PDF
(23) “Non-Simultaneous Causation,” Analysis 47 (1987) pp. 28-32. PDF
(24) “Papineau on Causal Asymmetry,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1987) pp. 81-87. PDF
(25) “Cohen, Exploitation, and Theft,” Dialogue, 26 (1987) pp. 299-308. PDF
(26) “Causal Relata,” Synthese, 73 (1987) pp. 319-328. PDF
(27) “Personal Identity and Time Travel,” Philosophical Studies, 52 (1987) pp. 427-433. PDF
(28) “Compound Emphasis and Causal Relata,” Analysis, 47 (1987) pp. 209-213. PDF
(29) “Causal Asymmetry and Causal Relata,” Synthese, 76 (1988) pp. 371-375. PDF
(30) “Preemption and Probabilistic Counterfactual Theory,” Philosophical Studies, 56 (1989) pp. 307-313. PDF
(31) “The ‘only t1 through t2’ Principle,” Analysis, 49 (1989) pp. 176-177. PDF
(32) “Are Workers Forced to Work?,” The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19 (1989) pp. 589-602. PDF
(33) “Preemption, Direct Causation, and Identity,” Synthese 85 (1990) pp. 55-70. PDF
(34) “Nonbranching and Nontransitivity,” Analysis 50 (1990) pp. 268-271. PDF
(35) “Motion, Causation, and the Causal Theory of Identity,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1991) pp. 180-194.
(36) “Eells’ on Token Causation and Preemption,” Philosophical Studies 74 (1994) pp. 39-50. PDF
(37) “Personal Identity and the R-Relation,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1995) pp. 337-46. PDF
(38) “Mental Causation, Determinables, and Property Instances,” Nous 30 (1996) pp. 461-480. PDF
(39) “Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics, and Momentary Tropes,” Analysis 57 (1997) PDF
(40) “Fission, Fusion and the Parfit Revolution,” Philosophical Studies (1998) PDF
(41) “Trope Persistence and Temporary External Relations,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1998) PDF
(42) “Tropeless in Seattle: The Cure for Insomnia,” Analysis 59 (1999) pp.19-24. PDF
(43) “Temporal Parts and Bundle Theory,” Philosophical Studies 104 (2001) pp. 163- 168. PDF
(44) “Spatial Relations Between Universals,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002) pp. 17-23. PDF
(45) “The Causal Argument Against Natural Class Trope Nominalism,” Philosophical Studies 107 (2002) pp. 179-190. PDF
(46) “Part-Whole Physicalism and Mental Causation,” 136 (2003) Synthese pp.359-388. PDF
(47) “Counterfactual Theories, Preemption and Persistence,” Chance and Cause: Causation in an Indeterministic World, eds, Dowe and Noordhof (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 58-76.
(48) “Property Counterparts and Natural Class Trope Nominalism,” 82 (2004) The Australasian Journal of Philosophy pp. 436-454. PDF
(49) “Distinguishing Universals From Particulars,” 64 (2004) Analysis pp. 326-332. PDF
(50) “Abstracting Away from Preemption,” (2009) The Monist, pp. 41-71. PDF
(51) “Causal Relata,” (2009) Oxford Handbook on Causation, eds. Beebee, Hitchcock, Menzies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
(52) “Why Parfit Did Not Go Far Enough,” 165 (2013) Philosophical Studies, pp. 133-149. PDF
(53) “Contemporary Theories: Humean Themes,” (2014) (in Efficient Causation: A History, ed. Schmaltz, Oxford Philosophical Concepts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Sample of review comments on Efficient Causation: A History.
“[E]ach contributor provides an expert treatment of a chapter in the history of efficient causation, and the book as a whole gives a useful framework to reflect historically on a key philosophical concept.” –Journal of the History of Philosophy
“This fine history of the evolution of conceptions of causation has no rival… Contributors’ reflections on the interactive development of philosophical conceptions of the concept of efficient causation make this a complex but rewarding work for advanced students of philosophy. Comprehensive index and bibliography… Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-level undergraduates and above.” –Choice
“Does the volume achieve these big-picture goals? Yes, for the most part. The quality of the scholarship is very high without being unapproachable, the volume lays out a detailed and insightful history of its target concept, and the Reflections are engaging and thought provoking…volume succeeds admirably in its stated goals…Efficient Causation is a history of causation written for metaphysicians. By those lights, it is excellent.”
–Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online
“The volume showcases crucial elements that at one point or another entered into philosophical views of efficient causation. It provides a useful framework for taking a fresh look at existing work on causation…This Oxford Philosophical Concepts anthology represents a great first step toward a better, historicallysituated, understanding of efficient causation. As such it is a welcome addition to the philosophical literature.” — American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
(54) “The Trope Coextension Problem,” in Nominalism about Properties: New Essays, eds. Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. and Ghislain, G. (Routledge), 2015.
Sample of review comments on Nominalism about Properties: New Essays
“These papers make important contributions to the historical understanding of the development of nominalism and to evaluating the prospects of nominalist theories of properties in contemporary debates.” Bryan Pickel, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
(55) “Why Parfit Cannot Generalize from Fission,” 59 (3) (2018) Analytic Philosophy, pp. 413-425. PDF
(56) “Johansson on Fission,” Acta Analytica (2019) 34 (2) pp 155–163. PDF
(57) “Why Parfit Can Rebut Johnston’s Reductio,” Theoria (2020) 86 (5) 583-594. PDF
(58) “Fission and Anticipating Having an Experience,” Synthese (2020) 198 (12):12223-12234 PDF
(59) “Trope Nominalisms,” in Routledge Handbook on Properties, eds. Anna-Sofia Maurin and Anthony Fisher, Routledge (2024). PDF
(60). “Does Parfit Establish Non-Reductionists Should Accept the Extreme Claim?” (2024) Philosophia 52 (1): 57-68. PDF
(61) “Must Exploiters Objectively Benefit from Exploitation?” (forthcoming) Moral Philosophy and Politics PDF