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## SELL: "The Death of a Dream"

**HEALTHCARE:**

**Biotechnology and Drugs**

Financial Highlights		
	S&P	AMGN
<b>Purchase Price</b>		<b>\$59.66</b>
<b>Current Price</b>		<b>\$58.86</b>
Exchange		NASDAQ
Beta		0.75
Market Cap		\$79.0B
Shares Outstanding		1.25B
52 Week Low		\$65.24
52 Week High		\$52.00
ROA	7.4%	8.1%
ROE	19.5%	12.0%
Price/Equity	21.6	25.8
1-yr EPS growth	24.8%	6.0%
<b>Intrinsic Value (DCF)</b>		<b>\$58.64</b>

### Qualitative Issues

- Future revenue growth slowdown
- Missed 4th quarter earnings
- Scrapped development of Parkinson's drug
- Issued warning on key drug, Aranesp (23.7% of sales)
- Despite similar drug, has not capitalized from "Vioxx scare"
- Reimbursement risk with Medicare regulatory strife
- Saturation and IPO failures lend to sector's lackluster performance
- Increased FDA regulations puts biotechs on alert
- Inefficiencies in Biotech relate to slowing growth
- Adopting big Pharma stagnating bureaucratic business model

### Quantitative Issues

- DCF reveals that stock is fairly priced
- High P/E Ratio relative to competitors
- ROE lower than aggregate and several competitors
- ROA low in comparison to aggregate and several competitors

**Chart 1: 2-Year Amgen v. S&P Return**

### COMPANY PROFILE



Amgen Inc., which is a global biotechnology company, strives to discover, develop, manufacture, and market human therapeutics based on advances in molecular and cellular biology. The company's three main areas of focus are oncology, nephrology, and inflammation, and the company has five main therapeutic agents that account for over 90% of their product sales. Aranesp and Epogen are both prescription drugs designed to treat anemia that develops in patients on chemotherapy or who suffer from chronic kidney failure. Neulasta and Neupogen are used to prevent infection in cancer patients who are undergoing chemotherapy. Enbrel is a drug designed for patients suffering from rheumatoid arthritis. In July 2004, Amgen acquired Turalik for over \$1 billion in an attempt to expand its R&D capabilities in the areas in which it has already invested, including oncology and inflammatory diseases.

### INVESTMENT THESIS

Amgen seems to exhibit little room for growth. It has recently revealed some unfavorable news, which causes us to question its growth potential. Additionally, our exposure to the biotechnology sector should be reevaluated due to the climate of change for FDA regulation and Medicare reimbursement, saturation of the market, and the move towards and inefficient, more bureaucratic business model. Our DCF indicates that Amgen is fairly priced. As a result of each of these considerations, **we recommend that the Ann Rife Cox Portfolio sells Amgen.**

## **BUSINESS FUNDAMENTALS**

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### **Earnings Disappointment Could Indicate Future**

At the end of January, Amgen announced that it missed its 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter earnings estimates for 2004. It fell short of analyst EPS estimates by three cents per share. This failure to meet earnings could be the beginning of a predicted slowdown for Amgen in 2005. Amgen's CEO, Ken Sharer recently revealed that Amgen would not continue its past phenomenal growth in 2005.

### **Drug Woes**

Certain negative issues have arisen this year regarding certain side effects produced by Amgen's drugs. In mid-January, Amgen issued a statement to warn doctors that one of its key drugs, Aranesp, can cause cardiovascular problems when administered in high doses. The FDA recommended that Amgen issue this warning after learning that two other comparable drugs produced this effect. Aranesp, a drug used to treat anemia in chemotherapy and dialysis patients, accounted for \$2.5 billion (23.7%) of Amgen's 2004 sales.

Additionally, Amgen has not benefited from the removal of a competitor's arthritis drug from the market. After Merck pulled Vioxx as a result of its potentially mortal side effects, we speculated that Enbrel, Amgen's arthritis drug, might be able to capture its market share. However, Enbrel did not increase its market share in 2004 as a result of the emergence of another competitor's drug. Abbott's rival drug, Humera, prevented Enbrel from capitalizing on Merck's loss.

Lastly, Amgen halted the development of a drug after it caused harmful effects in test subjects. Amgen discontinued the Phase II study of its Parkinson's drug, GDNF as a result of two findings. First, the drug was not found to be any more effective than a placebo, which was administered to another test group. Secondly, upon further research, Amgen realized that the drug could cause irreversible brain damage. Amgen does not plan to continue further development or testing of this drug.

### **Continued Reimbursement Risk**

Oncology focused biotech firms, such as Amgen, are particularly vulnerable to the uncertainty regarding Medicare reimbursements to doctors who prescribe cancer drugs. "Preliminary data obtained by MedPac (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission) indicate that handling charges could be as much as 26% to 28% of drug's cost. Presently, these costs are covered by the 'spread' that doctors earn under the current Average Wholesale Price-based system. This spread, however, will be cut significantly in 2006 when HOPPS (hospital outpatient) reimbursement changes to ASP (average sales price)," said Bear Stearns. These increasing handling costs apply to 70% of Amgen's sales, thus increasing the risk that doctors might opt to prescribe cheaper generic substitutes for Amgen's drugs.

Although we anticipate that Amgen will ultimately survive these Medicare changes, a significant struggle is likely for the remainder of 2005 while the system adapts. The first quarter results have not been affected by these changes; however, we predict that there may be more risk to the second quarter as a result of the typical billing cycle length for many oncologists.

### **Inefficiencies in Biotech relate to Slowing Growth**

"I see great inefficiencies in pharma and biotech firms. We have all these opportunities but insufficient structures to pursue them," reported an analyst for Bear Stearns. Biotechnology was supposed to save big pharmaceutical companies by essentially outsourcing to provide new drugs and compounds for development. However, expanding biotech firms are currently starting to adopt the same bureaucratic systems as big pharmaceutical companies. While big pharmaceutical companies are beginning to combat the negative effects associated with this structure, many biotechnology firms, which were historically known as innovators, are falling victim to these

downfalls. The changing industry structure represents a continued cost that, in effect, forces investors to consider biotechnology as the death of a dream. "It's going to make investing in this group of companies much more treacherous," said Elliot Spar, a marketing analyst with Ryan Beck & Co. "This is a wakeup call."

Investors are still suspicious of biotechnology investments as a result of bad news in recent months, including Chiron Corp.'s flu vaccine shortage, Amgen's forecast for slowing growth, and the withdrawal of the multiple sclerosis treatment by Biogen and Elan Corp. In January of 2005 alone, the combined market capitalization of the biotechnology industry fell by 4.6 percent, while the Amex biotechnology has already decreased by 8 percent this year.

Additionally, the FDA has been more carefully scrutinizing drug approvals for biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms as a result of recent events, such as the "Vioxx scare." This will likely impact Amgen's bottom line, as it will translate into more exhaustive and costly clinical trials for drugs in their pipeline.

### **The Pharma Precedent in conjunction with the FDA**


The increasing size of biotech firms is causing them to follow marketing precedents set by pharmaceutical companies. Amgen recently decided to follow in the footsteps of pharmaceutical giants like Pfizer by taking its message straight to the public. Amgen created and aired a commercial for its psoriasis drug, Enbrel, in an effort to reach a larger audience who might benefit from this drug. After Amgen launched this ad, the Food and Drug Administration forced the company to pull the ad. Amgen referred to Enbrel as a "breakthrough," and this exaggeration is prohibited in drug advertising where similar products provide the same benefits but lack the benefit of the added hyperbole. Perhaps most significant, the FDA felt Amgen's ad minimized the risks associated with Enbrel, which may include developing tuberculosis. The removal of this ad reflects another kink in surviving their changing environment.

### **Saturated Sector lends to Lackluster Performance**

Five biotechnology companies have already gone public this year, all consistently pricing at the low end below their proposed range. After going public, the majority of these companies have seen their share prices drop by more than 10 percent since the offering. These difficult market conditions have put additional public offerings at a standstill.

Biotechnology did very little in 2004 and is longer considered to be a current market leader. The leaders are in energy, instead and money is now rotating out of the biotechnology sector. Over the last year, this process has accelerated and is reinforced by decreasing growth rates and return on equity and assets. The 52-week chart below shows the mirror-like performance of an ETF from the hot oil services sector, the Energy Select Sector SPDR, compared with two biotech ETFs.

**Chart 2: Biotech and Oil ETFs**



The chart indicates that over the last year, oil and biotech have consistently moved in opposite directions. The current impressive performance of the oil sector foretells the underperformance of biotechnology firms. Obviously not all biotech firms will be affected by challenges facing the biotech sector.

We believe that several smaller, more innovative companies will not be negatively impacted. However, we are fairly certain that Amgen, who is becoming a larger, less innovative player, will be affected by this phenomenon.

## COMPARABLE ANALYSIS

Amgen is a unique company considering that it boasts the largest market cap and highest revenue of all biotechnology companies. Thus, for our comps, we chose to use three biotechnology companies who engage in similar activities as Amgen. However, since none of these companies has a market cap or revenue that equals or exceeds Amgen's, we chose to include a larger company (Novartis) that devotes half of its business to biotech.

While Amgen boasts a high gross margin, a high EBITDA margin, and strong historical 3-year revenue and EPS growth ratios, we do not believe that it can sustain these rates of growth in the future. Its revenue growth rate of 26.3% in 2004 fell drastically from its revenue growth rate of 51.3% in 2003. We believe that Amgen has reached its growth peak and will not continually exhibit these strong growth rates and margins.

### Other areas of concern include:

- Present and Future Return on Equity: Amgen's ROE of 12.0% is lower than three of the four comps, and it is substantially lower than the Aggregate ROE of 20.2%. Additionally, Amgen's ROE will not improve in relation to its peers as it exhibits the lowest projected 2005 ROE among each of these comparable companies.
- Return on Assets: Amgen's ROA of 8.1% is lower than all but one comparable company, and it is much lower than the aggregate ROA.
- P/E Ratios: Amgen seems to be trading slightly cheap when compared with the Aggregate. However, Amgen's P/E ratios are higher than every company but Genetech. Considering Amgen's size in the biotech field, it is slightly alarming that it exhibits high P/E ratios in relation to smaller biotech companies.

#### Healthcare - Biotechnology (Dollars in Millions)

Company Name: Amgen, Inc.

Ticker: AMGN

	Amgen AMGN	Comp Aggregate	Baxter BAX	Genetech DNA	Novartis NVS	Serono SRA
<b>(Stock Data):</b>						
Total Mkt. Capitalization (Tot. Net Debt+MV of Equity)	\$78,845	\$219,545	\$25,296	\$60,547	\$122,791	\$10,911
<b>(Financial Ratios excl. debt ratios-see Risk Section)</b>						
LFY Gross Margin	83.6%		41.2%	85.4%	76.5%	86.1%
LFY EBITDA Margin	34.9%		12.7%	32.2%	28.1%	27.2%
ROE	12.0%	20.2%	10.5%	11.6%	17.1%	18.2%
ROA	8.1%	19.3%	2.7%	8.3%	10.6%	11.1%
Receivable Turnover	8.5		4.7	5.1	6.1	6.9
Inventory Turnover	1.7		2.4	0.6	1.5	1.0
Current Ratio	2.21		1.40	2.75	2.22	2.36
<b>(Growth/Return):</b>						
Historical 3 Year Revenue Growth Rate	38.0%		9.0%	31.3%	1.4%	21.2%
Historical 3 Year EPS Growth Rate	20.5%		-17.1%	70.8%	9.2%	19.3%
Projected ROE (NFY)	17.8%		31.1%	22.4%	19.5%	21.8%
CFY - NFY EPS Growth Rate	17.1%	14.6%	11.3%	31.8%	11.7%	21.7%
Proj. Growth in EPS 5 Years	17.8%	14.0%	10.8%	28.4%	12.1%	13.4%
Dividend Yield	0.0%		1.7%	0.0%	1.8%	0.9%
<b>(Risk):</b>						
Beta	0.64	0.40	0.66	1.06	0.04	1.12
VL Safety						
LT Debt / Market Capitalization (MV of Equity)	0.07	0.06	0.20	0.01	0.05	0.07
LT Debt / Common Equity (BV of Equity)	0.25	0.21	0.15	0.11	0.28	0.22
<b>(Valuation):</b>						
MV of Equity / Book Value	3.7	4.5	5.7	8.9	3.5	4.2
LTM Price / EPS Ratio ("P/E")	25.7	27.6	18.7	77.7	22.6	21.7
CFY Price / EPS Ratio ("P/E")	21.0	22.1	18.2	52.3	17.7	19.1
NFY Price / EPS Ratio ("P/E")	17.9	19.3	16.4	39.6	15.9	15.7
Total Market Capitalization / EBITDA	21.4	19.6	21.0	40.6	15.5	18.4
Relative P/E (CFY)	32.1		53.0	78.8	20.0	22.7
CFY P/E to CFY-NFY EPS Growth Rate	1.2	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	0.9
CFY P/E to Proj. Growth in EPS 5 Years	1.2	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.5	1.4

## DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

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We performed a discounted cash flow (**Exhibit 1**) analysis in order to determine the intrinsic value of Amgen's stock. Our DCF calculated the intrinsic value by averaging the results of five different methods – Unlevered Value, Adjusted Present Value, Flow to Equity, WACC with FCF and AT WACC with UFCF. The average of the results of each method revealed that the intrinsic value of Amgen's stock is \$58.64 per share. The price deviation across the five models was merely \$49m or 3.9%. Thus, according to our DCF, Amgen is fairly priced, which supports its status as a **sell**.

Valuation model used	Summary	
	Equity \$M	\$ Per Share
Unlevered value	\$70,413	\$56.20
Adjusted Present Value	\$73,713	\$58.83
Flow to Equity	\$71,753	\$57.27
WACC with FCF	\$73,877	\$58.96
AT-WACC with UFCF	\$74,547	\$59.49
<b>Average across models</b>	<b>\$73,473</b>	<b>\$58.64</b>
<b>Current Market Price per share:</b>		<b>\$58.86</b>

## ASSUMPTIONS

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### Beta

We calculated our beta based on Amgen's 5-year and 2-year historical betas. Bloomberg calculated the 5-year historical beta to be .94, while Reuters considered Amgen's 2-year historical beta to be .56. We calculated an average of these two betas to arrive at our beta of .75.

### Revenue Growth Percentage

Amgen's revenue growth rate decreased from 51.6% in 2003 to 23.6% in 2004. In predicting future growth rates, we strongly considered the current situation of the biotechnology industry and Amgen's CEO's admissions. He stated that their high past revenue growth rates would not continue and that investors should expect the 2005 revenue growth rate to be in the single digits. We estimated that the 2006 growth rate to be 7%. This rate declines each year by .5% until it reaches a growth rate of 5% in 2009. At this point, we continued to grow by 5% each year.

### Capital Expenditures to Depreciation Ratio

We calculated this ratio to be 108.5% by averaging the capital expenditures to depreciation ratios of the past three years. We assumed that this ratio was constant for purposes of growing capital expenditures in forecasted years.

### Depreciation

We calculated depreciation in forecasted years as 8.0% of PP&E from the previous year. Our 8.0% growth rate reflects our expectations for future depreciation based on the continual growth of the depreciation percentage in the past three years.

### Other Estimates

Other estimates used to calculate the intrinsic value of the firm include:

Risk Free Rate	3.60%
Equity Market Risk Premium	7.00%
Long Term Inflation	2.50%
Cost of Equity Capital	8.85%
Weighted Average Cost of Capital	8.64%
Terminal Growth Rate	5.00%

**Exhibit 1: Discounted Cash Flow**

(Dollars in Millions)	Time "0"	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012		
Net Income	\$	2,944	\$ 3,266	\$ 3,650	\$ 3,977	\$ 4,306	\$ 4,629	\$ 4,949	\$ 5,262		
Plus Depr. & Amort.		1,604	1,599	1,610	1,620	1,630	1,641	1,651	1,661		
Equals Value Line "Cash Flow"		4,548	4,865	5,260	5,597	5,936	6,269	6,599	6,924		
- Change in NWC Increases/(Decreases)		(1,604)	(592)	(603)	(611)	(614)	(613)	(606)	(594)		
= Cash Flow contributed by operations		2,945	4,273	4,657	4,986	5,322	5,657	5,993	6,329		
- Capital Expenditures: all categories		(1,725)	(1,647)	(1,639)	(1,650)	(1,661)	(1,672)	(1,684)	(1,697)		
Equals OCF to Equity (Before Debt Adjs.)	\$	1,219	\$ 2,626	\$ 3,017	\$ 3,335	\$ 3,661	\$ 3,985	\$ 4,309	\$ 4,632		
Tax Rate for leverage adjustments		31.2%	31.2%	31.2%	31.2%	31.2%	31.2%	31.2%	31.2%		
+ Increase (decrease) in debt		409	(1,591)	283	286	288	287	284	279		
Equals "EFCF" or "FCFE"	\$	1,628	\$ 1,035	\$ 3,300	\$ 3,622	\$ 3,949	\$ 4,272	\$ 4,593	\$ 4,911		
+ Interest Expense		264	273	186	190	193	206	218	230		
Equals "FCF"	\$	1,483	\$ 2,899	\$ 3,203	\$ 3,525	\$ 3,855	\$ 4,190	\$ 4,527	\$ 4,862		
- Interest Tax Shields		(82)	(85)	(58)	(59)	(60)	(64)	(68)	(72)		
Equals "UFCF"	\$	1,401	\$ 2,814	\$ 3,145	\$ 3,466	\$ 3,794	\$ 4,126	\$ 4,459	\$ 4,790		
<b>(Capital Structure Overview)</b>											
Accounting balance sheet (book value)											
Net Assets (LT Assets + NWC - Other LT Liab)	\$	24,815	\$ 26,540	\$ 27,180	\$ 27,813	\$ 28,454	\$ 29,099	\$ 29,743	\$ 30,382	\$ 31,013	
Total Debt	\$	5,110	\$ 5,519	\$ 3,928	\$ 4,211	\$ 4,497	\$ 4,785	\$ 5,072	\$ 5,356	\$ 5,635	
percentage of capital		20.6%	20.8%	14.5%	15.1%	15.8%	16.4%	17.1%	17.6%	18.2%	
Total Equity Book Value	\$	19,705	\$ 21,021	\$ 23,252	\$ 23,602	\$ 23,957	\$ 24,314	\$ 24,671	\$ 25,026	\$ 25,378	
percentage of capital		79.4%	79.2%	85.5%	84.9%	84.2%	83.6%	82.9%	82.4%	81.8%	
Economic balance sheet (intrinsic value - Time 0 based on avg. model price, 1-10 based on flow-to-equity)											
Total Market Value	\$	79,954	\$ 84,219	\$ 88,558	\$ 93,031	\$ 97,556	\$ 102,130	\$ 106,760	\$ 111,451	\$ 116,208	
Total Debt	\$	5,189	\$ 5,519	\$ 3,928	\$ 4,211	\$ 4,497	\$ 4,785	\$ 5,072	\$ 5,356	\$ 5,635	
percentage of market value		6.5%	6.6%	4.4%	4.5%	4.6%	4.7%	4.8%	4.8%	4.8%	
Intrinsic Value of Equity	\$	74,765	\$ 78,700	\$ 84,630	\$ 88,819	\$ 93,058	\$ 97,345	\$ 101,688	\$ 106,094	\$ 110,573	
percentage of market value		93.5%	93.4%	95.6%	95.5%	95.4%	95.3%	95.2%	95.2%	95.2%	
<b>Current Valuation Summary as of the beginning of yr. 2005 - Intrinsic Share Price (avg. across models): \$59.67</b>											
<b>Valuation model used</b>											
Summary		<b>Debt Cost of Capital Calculations:</b>			Principal		MV		Debt Rates		
	Equity \$M	\$ Per Share							Pre Tax	After Tax	
Unlevered value	\$72,229	\$57.64	Long Term Debt		\$ 3,937	\$4,016			5.8%	4.0%	
Adjusted Present Value	\$74,524	\$59.48	Notes and LT Debt Due		\$ 1,173	\$1,173			4.0%	2.7%	
Flow to Equity	\$73,797	\$58.90	Debt Type 3		0	\$0			0.0%	0.0%	
WACC with FCF	\$75,166	\$59.99	Total Debt		\$ 5,110	\$ 5,189			(a)		
AT-WACC with UFCF	\$75,574	\$60.31	wtd. avg. debt rate						5.4%	3.7%	
Average across models	\$74,765	\$59.67	Implicit cost of debt according to CAPM:						4.3%	3.0%	
Price deviation across models	\$30	2.4%	<b>Equity Cost of Capital Calculations:</b>								
<b>Key Assumptions for the models:</b>			Without APV:		2.4%		Total Value of Equity				
Date of valuation	12/31/03						\$ 73,752 (c)		Total Market Capitalization As c		
							\$ 78,940				
Risk Free Rate:	3.60%						Actual	Unlevered	Debt rates used		
Equity Market Risk Premium:	7.00%						Risk Free Rate	3.60%	3.60%	4.3%	3.0%
Long term inflation:	2.50%						Market Premium	7.00%	7.00%		
Terminal Growth:	4.00%						Beta Debt		0.10		
							Beta Equity	0.75	0.72		
							Beta - Adjusted Market Premium	5.25%	5.04%		
Equity beta based on VL:	0.75		<b>Various Costs of Capital</b>								
No. of shares (diluted):	1,253						R(u) - required return for firm if unlevered		8.64%		
Current Market Price per share:	\$58.86						R(e) - required return for equity as levered	8.85%			
							WACC			8.55%	
							AT-WACC				8.46%

**Exhibit 2: Historical and Projected Income Statement**

(Dollars in Millions)

	Year										
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total Revenue	3,629	4,016	5,523	8,356	10,550	11,394	12,260	13,143	14,036	14,935	15,831
Total Cost of Goods Sold	1,253	1,308	1,852	2,996	3,759	4,051	4,349	4,653	4,960	5,268	5,574
Gross Profit	2,376	2,708	3,671	5,360	6,791	7,343	7,911	8,490	9,076	9,667	10,256
SG&A (SHOULD EXCLUDE DEPR.)	210	363	893	1,234	1,237	1,331	1,430	1,530	1,631	1,733	1,835
Depreciation and Amortization	617	608	724	1,054	1,652	1,604	1,599	1,610	1,620	1,630	1,641
Other	5	206	2,838	(20)	554						
Total Operating Expenses	832	1,177	4,455	2,269	3,443	2,935	3,028	3,140	3,252	3,364	3,475
Operating Income	1,544	1,531	(784)	3,091	3,348	4,408	4,882	5,349	5,825	6,303	6,781
Other (non-operating) Income / (Ex)	146	169	144	113	85	135	138	142	145	149	152
EBIT, Earnings Before Interest and Taxes	1,690	1,700	(640)	3,205	3,433	4,543	5,020	5,491	5,970	6,452	6,934
Interest Expense	16	14	44	32	38	264	273	186	190	193	206
Other (non-recurring) Charges (pre	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EBT, Earnings Before Taxes	1,674	1,686	(684)	3,173	3,395	4,279	4,747	5,305	5,780	6,259	6,728
Income Taxes (payable)	536	567	707	914	1,032	1,335	1,481	1,655	1,803	1,953	2,099
Tax Rate	32.0%	33.6%	-103.4%	28.8%	30.4%	31.2%	31.2%	31.2%	31.2%	31.2%	31.2%
Net Income	\$ 1,139	\$ 1,120	\$ (1,392)	\$ 2,260	\$ 2,363	\$ 2,944	\$ 3,266	\$ 3,650	\$ 3,977	\$ 4,306	\$ 4,629

**Exhibit 3: Historical and Projected Balance Sheet**

(Dollars in Millions)

	Year										
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Cash and Equivalents	\$ 2,028	\$ 2,662	\$ 4,664	\$ 5,123	\$ 5,808	7,360	7,919	8,490	9,067	9,647	10,226
Accounts Receivable	389	497	752	1,008	1,461	1,427	1,536	1,646	1,758	1,871	1,983
Inventories	305	356	545	713	888	1,004	1,081	1,159	1,237	1,317	1,395
Other Current Assets	215	344	442	559	1,013	883	951	1,019	1,088	1,158	1,227
Total Current Assets	2,937	3,859	6,404	7,402	9,170	10,675	11,467	12,314	13,151	13,993	14,832
PPE and Intangibles, Net	2,463	2,585	18,053	18,711	20,051	19,985	20,127	20,251	20,379	20,506	20,635
Investments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other Long Term Assets	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Long Term Assets	2,463	2,585	18,053	18,711	20,051	19,985	20,127	20,251	20,379	20,506	20,635
Total Assets	\$ 5,400	\$ 6,443	\$ 24,456	\$ 26,113	\$ 29,221	\$ 30,660	\$ 31,613	\$ 32,565	\$ 33,529	\$ 34,499	\$ 35,467
Accounts Payable & Accrued Liabilities	762	903	1,406	2,456	2,984	2,886	3,105	3,329	3,555	3,782	4,009
Other Current Liabilities	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Notes and LT Debt due	100	100	123	-	1,173	1,267	902	967	1,032	1,098	1,164
Total Current Liabilities	862	1,003	1,529	2,456	4,157	4,153	4,007	4,295	4,587	4,881	5,174
Other Long Term Liabilities	-	-	1,462	1,188	1,422	1,234	1,328	1,424	1,520	1,618	1,715
Long Term Debt	223	223	3,080	3,080	3,937	4,252	3,026	3,244	3,465	3,667	3,908
Total Long Term Liabilities	\$ 223	\$ 223	\$ 4,542	\$ 4,268	\$ 5,359	\$ 5,486	\$ 4,354	\$ 4,668	\$ 4,985	\$ 5,304	\$ 5,623
Total Stockholders' Equity	4,315	5,217	18,386	19,390	19,705	21,021	23,252	23,602	23,957	24,314	24,671
Total Liabilities & Stockholders' Equity	5,400	6,443	24,456	26,113	29,221	30,660	31,613	32,565	33,529	34,499	35,467
Total Debt for leverage calculations	323	323	3,202	3,080	5,110	5,519	3,928	4,211	4,497	4,785	5,072
Total Debt and Stock	4,637	5,540	21,588	22,469	24,815	26,540	27,180	27,813	28,454	29,099	29,743